We present a model of legislative/congressional organization and policymaking that provides micro-foundations for the organization of democratic legislatures along party lines. Our theory recovers as special cases the predictions of both partisan and non-partisan theories in the ongoing debate on the strength of political parties' independent in ‡uence on legislative outcomes (e.g. Cox vs. Krehbiel). We model collective decision making in the legislature as a two-stageorganization and policy -bargaining game. The policy stage is modeled as busy legislature where members vote on proposals based on their unconstrained preferences over policy. Unlike partisan theories our model does not rely on the existence of a party leadership being able to use legislative or extra-legislative punishments in order to induce members to toe the party line. In our model partisan outcomes arise because legislators who have preference a¢ nities choose to skew the distribution of agenda power towards their group. In equilibrium the distribution of agenda power can thus be inegalitarian, leading to policy outcomes biased away from the median. Our theory is also able to uncover the conditions under which median outcomes nevertheless prevail: low bargaining costs or the median monopolizes agenda power. We discuss the implications of our …ndings for a general theory of legislative organization.
Introduction
Theoretical debates over the role of parties in Congress are as old as the modern study of Congress itself. While classical texts such as David Mayhew's Congress: The Electoral Connection had previously questioned the role of parties in Congressional politics the publication of Keith Krehbiel's "Where is the Party?" (Krehbiel 1996) recently reignited the debate leading to scores of articles and books including the unusual case of a book "sequel" (Cox and McCubbins 2005) following the original (Cox and McCubbins 1993 ). Yet, the debate does not appear to be abating in the slightest. In part, this may be due to the fact that parties are among the more complex political institutions, closely connected to both legislative and electoral politics that, as research domains, usually progress in isolation from each other. The key question underlying the debate is, simply put, whether parties as legislative institutions are able to signi…cantly in ‡uence the behavior of members of Congress.
What has fueled the debate has been the elusiveness of robust and valid measures of such in ‡uence. On the one hand, there seems to be agreement what a conclusive test would look like (e.g. Krehbiel 2006a ). We would need for each of the hundreds of bills considered by Congress in each term the distribution of ideological ideal points, bill locations in the same ideological space, a complete description of the proposal generating process and other potentially relevant institutional features. Ideal points would have to be "una¤ected by party in ‡uence" (Krehbiel 2006a ). We could then measure party in ‡uence by whether the measured behavior (e.g. location of …nal bill, voting behavior etc.) would support the idea that policy outcomes are biased away from the chamber median toward the party median. Unfortunately, the key components of such a test (ideological and bill locations) are either not directly observable or are based on measurement models that are themselves heavily contested. Consider the issue of estimating ideal points. The most widely used measures of ideal points, DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1985 , 1997 , 2005 , are derived from roll-call votes. But as Krehbiel has repeatedly pointed out (e.g. Krehbiel 2006a) this approach is unsuitable to isolate and measure the e¤ects of parties. The problem is that observed voting patterns may be consistent both with strong party-leadership models and models where representatives'preferences are already aligned with parties. Suppose, for example, that all members of the governing party always vote with the leadership. Then, this voting behavior may be due to e¤ective leaders (through incentives, credible threats or agenda control) or due to the fact that party members when they enter Congress have preferences over policy outcomes already aligned with the leadership. Hence, in the absence of exogenous measures of basic preferences, i.e. those that are una¤ected by partisan in ‡uence, roll-call data alone seem insu¢ cient for testing party-in ‡uence theories.
Much of the existing debate on the in ‡uence of parties has focused on measurement and the correct interpretation of new and established empirical …ndings. While formal models are part of the debate they usually play a limited role, e.g. in illustrating how to properly interpret certain data.
But there is no comprehensive model that provides a rigorous formal foundation for the competing accounts. This is particularly ironic, since many of the proponents of the various proposed accounts are distinguished formal theorists. The goal of this paper is provide such a foundation. While the proposed framework is novel our goal is not to add yet another theory of parties in legislatures but to advance a formal representation of the competing approaches that may be used as a framework to properly (re-)focus the debate. That is, our model will take components from the various approaches and combine them into an integrated model. Surprisingly, far from creating a chimera the resulting model not only allows us to precisely identify the implicit assumptions in the competing approaches but to reconcile them in a single model. That is, our model contains the competing accounts (at least in our formal representations) as special cases in a nested framework.
Since our …rst goal is to speak to an ongoing debate we take the somewhat unusual step to occasionally quote from the various accounts. In other words, we will exercise considerable e¤ort to convince the reader that our representation is as faithful as we can make it. We begin with a formal representation of the position that started the debate: Krehbiel's view of parties as agglomerations of like-minded legislators.
The Baseline Model: Parties as Agglomerations of Like-Minded Legislators
We start our formal model with Krehbiel's concept of "weak parties," i.e. the view that a party is simply a happenstance collection of legislators who share policy dispositions on issues. Legislative institutions, incentives, or agenda control play no role (Krehbiel 2006a ). For our purposes this concept will serve as a baseline model. We will derive its implications and then step by step add features that characterize alternative accounts. Then, we derive the augmented model's implications and compare them to the baseline model.
We formalize Krehbiel's position using the standard spatial model. Let N be a set of size jN j = 2k + 1 legislators, where k 2 is an integer. The policy space X is a compact interval on the real line: X = [x; x] R: All legislators have quadratic preferences over this policy space. Let b x i denote the ideal point of legislator i. His preferences over policies in X will be represented by the quadratic utility function:
2 for i 2 f1; 2; :::; 2k + 1g =: N and for all x 2 X:
We assume that ideal points are arranged equidistantly in the policy space; we denote the distance between any two adjacent ideal points by d: 1 Figure 1 illustrates the policy space and the distribution of ideal points. In the …gure q stands for the status quo policy.
We now formally represent the notion of parties as "like-minded individuals." Here, there is no canonical model. Recently Krehbiel (2006b) proposed a spatial model and Krehbiel (2006a) a probabilistic model. Our model combines the two approaches. We want to capture the stylized fact that on di¤erent issues a legislator may be at di¤erent places on the left-right ideological spectrum, but that members of the same party are more likely to be on the same side of the issue.
In other words there may be issues where party members think alike but also issues that may cut across party lines. 2 We partition the set of legislators into two disjoint subsets A = f1; 2; :::; kg and B = fk +1; k +2; :::; 2k +1g. Thus group B has one member more than group A: There are (2k +1)! di¤erent possible ordering of ideal points. Denote a generic ordering by ! = (! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 ; :::; ! 2k+1 ).
For instance, with …ve legislators one possible ordering is (b
, where A and B types are completely separated; another possible ordering is (b
where A and B types mix with each other. The ideal point that separates the set of legislators into two groups of equal size k will be referred to as the median (ideal point).
Denote the density of an ordering ! with A-legislators on the left by f (!): We assume that any given ordering comes a probability distribution over the space of (2k + 1)! distinct orderings of 1 We therefore implicitly assume that the length of the policy space is at least 2kd i.e. j x xj 2kd: 2 In this paper we do not model where these issues come from. They may be strategically selected ("Gays in the Military"), imposed by external events ("9/11") or be a combination of both, for example, elevating a personal event or tragedy to increased political signi…cance ("Patty Schiavo"). As discussed below we do model agenda setting. In other words, we do not model the topics of political debate, but we do model how these topics are converted to concrete bill proposals. ideal points that. The distribution has the following properties:
(i) All orderings with the same number of A-legislators to the left of the median are equally likely i.e. f (!) = f for all !.
(ii) An ordering with more A-legislators to the left is at least as likely as an ordering with fewer A-legislators on the left i.e. f f +1 for all = 0; 1; :::; k 1:
To capture various degrees to which A-and B-legislators are separated probabilistically across the ideological spectrum in a left-of-median group and a median-and-right-of-median group, de…ne the following feature of the density f :
where t is the total number of di¤erent orderings having A-legislators on the left. 3 Note that
The parameter measures the average proportion of A-legislators that will be located to the left, or alternatively the probability that a randomly selected A-legislator is on the left. Thus it captures in a single number between min and max = 1 the degree of preference polarization in the legislature. When f = f +1 = 1 (2k+1)! for all then = min and so all orderings are equally likely; in other words each legislator can be at any position on the ideological spectrum with equal probability and there is no polarization, i.e. preferences are homogenous across the legislature. When f = 0 for = 0; 1; :::; k 1 and f k+1 = 1 t k+1 then = 1 and all orderings feature complete separation between A-legislators and B-legislators. Note that even when As and Bs do not mix the position of a given legislator is not …xed but may still vary with the issue: for instance a left-wing legislator may be extremely liberal on social issues, but only moderately leftist on economic issues. Ex ante, however, before a policy issue arises, the various types of possible issues are equally likely.
The family of probability distributions just described essentially captures two preference types, A and B. To see this more clearly note that the location of any given member of the legislature is a random variable that follows a "skewed" uniform distribution i.e. a discrete distribution over all 2k + 1 ideal policy positions in which an A-legislator can have an ideal policy at any of the left-of-median locations with the same probability and an ideal policy at any of the median-andright-of-median locations with an equal probability, that is at most as large than for a left-of median location. Similarly for a B-legislator. The skewness is thus to the right for an A-legislator and to the left for a B-legislator.
A few comments are in order.
Where do preference similarities come from? Krehbiel's approach starts with the assumption that party members have similar preferences. It does not provide a theory for where these preferences come from. They may be based on selection due to personal ideology (i.e. individuals with a conservative word view may be more likely to join the Republican party) or they may be the consequences or electoral institutions and constituency characteristics. For example, parties may represent "brands", i.e. cognitive short-cuts that help voters solve their informational problems (e.g. Snyder and Ting 2002). However, from Krehbiel's point of view these questions do not need to be answered by a theory of legislative institutions. Rather, they belong into the domain of electoral studies. In other words, legislative theories (at least choice-based approaches) take basic preferences of legislators as given and then study how their behavior may change in response to incentives in the chamber. For example, it appears perfectly consistent with Krehbiel's approach that party leaders withold electoral endorsements or restrict campaign funds to discipline candidates. But these mechanisms must be purely electoral; they cannot involve legislative institutions such as the threat of withdrawal of committee membership, agenda control and so forth. Indeed Krehbiel's claim is that the latter institutions have no measurable e¤ect on the behavior of members of Congress.
Parties-as-Cartels. In turn, it is important to understand what the Krehbiel approach rules out. It is inconsistent with any control of legislative institutions or procedure by parties and the use of such institutions to discipline members. This, of course, is the essence of the parties-ascartels approach (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005 ). The idea is that forming a legislative cartel provides various bene…ts to members but creates a collective action problem. In other words the cartel needs to be enforced by selective incentives and punishments. The assumption is that legislative leaders have various tools to discipline members (impose punishments), for example, excluding them from a particularly attractive committee. A note of caution: Unfortunately, the parties-as-brands approach and the parties-as-cartels approach are frequently mixed up and (in our view) unneccessarily identi…ed. When we say "parties as cartels" we mean the case where collaboration among party members is enforced by legislative means. The goal is the control of the legislative process. Note that there is no logical inconsistency between supporting Krehbiel's view on legislative parties and also holding the parties-as-brands position. Such a position simply claims that all possible disciplining of party members is limited to incentives related to campaigns and elections. On the other hand, we can also have a case of parties-as-cartels without any relationship to parties-as-brands. This would be the case, for example, when we study pre-modern or authoritarian legislatures where parties exists (in this case they perhaps should better be called "factions") but there are no meaningful elections. Of course, one can also hold both positions as do Cox and McCubbins. In this case, the idea is that the use of legislative punishments further enhances the arsenal of party leaders and therefore makes it easier to maintain well-de…ned brands. Again, this is perhaps a plausible position, but it is not logically necessary. 4 The debate over legislative parties therefore comes down to whether parties can serve as legislative cartels. The legislative cartel theory comes in two variations. Cox and McCubbins (2005) clearly state the distinction. We quote from their chapter 2. (p. 19).
Parties as Floor Voting Coalitions
Some partisan theories view parties primarily as ‡oor voting coalitions. In such theories the central issue is the degree to which parties can discipline their members, ensuring a cohesive voting bloc on the ‡oor, even when there are internal disagreements over policy (...)
Parties as Procedural Coalitions
Other partisan theories, including our own, view parties primarily as procedural coalitions. For such theories, the central issue is the majority party's ability to control the legislative agenda, de…ned as the set of bills considered and voted on the ‡oor. Our focus in this paper is squarely on the second approach: parties as procedural coalitions.
We explicitly rule out parties as ‡oor voting coalitions. To be more precise, in our model the parties have no incentives available to discipline their members when they are voting on policy. 6 This is equivalent to assuming that Krehbiel's baseline model holds for votes on policy. Cox However, Cox and McCubbins later do allow for the possibility of parties as ‡oor voting coalitions as well (now called "super-structural"; p.5). We adopt the Krehbiel baseline model not because we necessarily believe it holds, but because it allows us to precisely isolate what the Parties-asprocedural-coalitions view entails. As we show later, however, it alone is su¢ cient to create highly biased policy outcomes. In other words, incentives to induce members to deviate from their basic preferences on policy are an unneccessary assumption.
In their analysis Cox and McCubbins emphasize negative legislative power, i.e. the ability to block legislation, compared to positive legislative power, i.e. the ability to ensure passage (Diermeier and Myerson 1999) . One possible reason for the focus on negative power is the overwhelming empirical evidence that Congressional committees lack positive power in contrast to, e.g. cabinet ministries in parliamentary democracies Shepsle 1990, 1996) . Cox and McCubbins argue that negative power is executed through gate-keeping, i.e. the ability to prevent proposals from coming to a vote on the ‡oor. An alternative approach is to focus on proposal power (e.g. (1)
The notion of agenda control presupposes control over legislative institutions.
(2) Control over legislative institutions depends on support of the chamber majority (the "median voter") (3) Therefore, policy outcomes cannot be biased away from the median as the median could otherwise simply change the organizational structure.
In other words, in Krehbiel's view the whole concept of parties-as-cartels critically depends upon the ability of using legislative procedures to impose punishments. But the use of legislative procedures needs support of the entire chamber. Party majorities are not enough. Note that extra-legislative punishments and incentives, e.g. electoral ones such as endorsements or support in campaign …nancing or fund-raising, do not play into this argument, they are orthogonal. That is, if one believes in the ability of parties to use electoral punishments those would be incorporated into the legislators'basic preferences.
Institutions as Congealed Tastes. The structure of Krehbiel's argument seems utterly compelling. However, as we intend to show below, we believe there is a gap, which lies in the step from (2) to (3). Krehbiel's argument presupposes that because the median rules on policy choice it must be in the median's interest to rectify any possible deviation from the median's ideal point on a given policy by adjusting the procedural context or the organizational structure. For example, if committees keep the gates closed and frustate a chamber majority that would like to consider the bill on the ‡oor, why does the ‡oor not simply vote on a discharge procedure, and if the exact details of the discharge procedure are too onerous why not change them to make it easier to the chamber majority to obtain its preferred outcome? In other words, organizational structures are just more or less complicated choice alternatives subject to the same voting rules as votes on policies. Preferences over policy will determine preferences over institutional arrangements. There can be no gap between majorities on policies and majorities on procedures. 7 Of course, there are many ways to model procedural rules and proposal protocols. We will propose a particularly ‡exible model that (as one of its limiting cases) can faithfully represent Krehbiel's conjecture as a theorem.
The reader may disagree with this speci…c model. However, in that case, at least, we could locate the exact point of disagreement: how to model procedural rules and organizational structure.
The Role of Punishments. Much of the existing literature on parties assumes the need for incentives and punishments. The premise is that the core strategic problem that a party faces has the nature of a collective action problem. A good example is the idea that a "brand" constitutes a public good that is valuable for party members but that (some) members have an incentives to vote against the party due to, e.g. constituency constraints. More generally, the idea is that in any given case there is a need to vote according to the party line (either on policy or on procedural votes) even though the basic preferences of members would suggest otherwise. It is then assumed that these problems can only be overcome by the use of credible threats to punish defectors and reward cooperators. 8 In our view, this (shared) assumption is exactly where the problem lies as it makes testing of the party in ‡uence hypothesis di¢ cult, if not impossible. To test the party in ‡uence hypothesis we need to specify a baseline of "una¤ected preferences"and then measure to what extent party in ‡uence is able to induce members to deviate from their choices. But once we believe that party leaders have threats or rewards at their disposal, members'preferences over bills and the status no longer re ‡ect their basic preferences, i.e. those una¤ected by party in ‡uence, but their induced preferences that now include contingent incentives as well. But any roll call based measure will re ‡ect induced, not basic, preferences thus making it impossible to test the party-as-cartel hypothesis.
To avoid this problem other measures have been proposed. A prominent one is "roll rates" (Cox and McCubbins 2005) , and we will return to these measures below. At this point, however, we wish to argue that the focus on punishment and incentives may be a theoretical dead-end. In other words, we will propose a theory of legislative organization that supports e¤ective procedural 7 We see here the remnants of a famous argument by Riker (1980) where he criticized the emergence of structureinduced-equilibrium models (Shepsle 1979) as proposed solutions to the cycling problems. Riker viewed institutions as "congealed tastes." Therefore, if there is cycling on policy alternatives, there must be cycling on institutions. The problem with this argument is that it never models procedural rules or the proposal process. Indeed, Diermeier (1997) shows that Riker's argument does not hold once we model voting and decision-making as a non-cooperative game. 8 The classic reference for such approaches is, of course, Olson (1975 Premises (1)- (3) seem utterly uncontroversial. 9 Together they imply that any vote on a given bill is subject to an opportunity cost. That is, the time spent on any given bill could be used to debate or decide on some other proposal. Cox (2006) argues that these time constraints are substantial, 10 in other words: too many bills, too little time. 11 We can formally represent this idea with the following model of legislative decision-making.
Once a policy issue has arisen the ordering of ideal points of members of the legislature is common knowledge. At that point legislators can make a proposal to change the status quo, but this requires that they are recognized to speak. We allow for the possibility that some legislators have more agenda power than others. Formally the distribution of agenda power in the legislature is modeled as a vector of recognition probabilities from the 2k-dimensional unit simplex:
The timing of the policy stage of our game (conditional on a recognition vector, an ordering of ideal points, and a status quo location) is as follows (see Figure 2 ):
(P1) A legislator is recognized to make a policy proposal p i 2 X (the proposal can be the status quo itself). If a legislator is indi¤erent among several proposals we assume that he will put forth 9 In passing we point out that (2) is identical to claim (2) in Krehbiel's argument. 1 0 Cox (2006) argues that (in the absence of agenda control) legislators have an incentive to hold the legislature hostage using delay and blocking tactics. While this argument is certainly plausible and consistent with our approach, our approach does not presuppose it to be true. 1 1 Cox (2006) also argues that the fact that legislatures are busy leads to the development of highly unequal institutions that regulate access to ‡oor time. We will return to this argument later.
Recognition
Legislator i is selected with probability i r .
Vote
The proposal is put to a majority vote against the status quo. the one that has a better chance to be accepted.
Proposal
(P2) All legislators simultaneously vote on the proposal p i . The vote can be either to accept or to reject the proposal.
(P3) The voting rule is simple majority rule: if k + 1 or more legislators vote for the proposal, bargaining stops and the adopted proposal is implemented immediately and in all subsequent periods. If less than k + 1 legislators vote for the proposal the status quo q 2 X prevails during the current period and bargaining continues i.e. stages (P1) to (P3) are repeated.
All legislators share a common discount factor denoted by ; where 0 < 1: The lifetime utility of legislator i from the sequence of policies (p t ) t=1;2;::: adopted at the policy stage is:
A history of length t is a collection of data describing the identity of the recognized proposers, the policy each one proposed and how each legislator voted. A strategy for a legislator is a mapping from the set of histories to the set of available actions (policy proposals, votes). In what follows we restrict attention to pure strategies.
A voting strategy for legislator i is a measurable map r i : X ! faccept, rejectg. Following
Banks and Duggan (2003) we …nd it convenient to construct our arguments using the set of policies that are deemed acceptable to legislator i; formally denoted
and referred to as the acceptance set of legislator i: Given a pro…le of acceptance sets (A 1 ; A 2 ; :::; A 2k+1 ) de…ne the social acceptance set as:
that is, the set of policies that are acceptable to a majority of legislators. Here M denotes any group of legislators that constitutes a majority.
Given the assumed timing of legislative bargaining a sequence of equilibrium policy outcomes can take one of the following forms For each vector of recognition probabilities 2 2k (") the bargaining game taking place in the organizational period may yield di¤erent equilibrium outcomes. We study behavior in stationary equilibria of these games, de…ned as in Austen-Smith and Banks (2006) . Following Banks and
Duggan (2003) we also de…ne two properties of stationary equilibria of our policy bargaining game governed by a given allocation of agenda-setting rights .
De…nitions The following de…nitions refer to an equilibrium of the policy game described in
A stationary equilibrium is an undominated subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies, i.e. strategies that are independent of the history of play up to the current period.
A stationary equilibrium is static if the equilibrium outcome of bargaining is no change from the status quo i.e. the sequence of policies (q; q; :::):
A stationary equilibrium is no-delay if every legislator who has positive recognition probability proposes a policy that is accepted by a majority. The outcome of this equilibrium behavior is thus a sequence of policies of the form (p; p; :::), where p is the policy proposed by the legislator who is recognized in the …rst period.
Given an equilibrium 12 [(p i ) ; (A i )] i2N =: the continuation value of a legislator in period t is his expected utility evaluated at the beginning of the next period t + 1 if the proposal made in the current period is rejected. Since we will be interested solely in stationary equilibria, the continuation value of a legislator in any such equilibrium does not depend on time and will thus be denoted simply by v i ( ): We also notice that if the stationary equilibrium is no-delay, the continuation value of a legislator i takes the simple form:
The acceptance set of legislator i in the equilibrium ; given a proposal p; is:
Our …rst results characterize the stationary equilibrium of the policy game for a given recognition vector . All proofs are relegated to the appendix. The …rst proposition covers the case where the median legislator's ideal point is distinct from the status quo. The second proposition characterizes stationary equilibria in the case where the median's ideal point is the status quo.
Consider …rst the case where the median's ideal is away from the status quo. The next proposition states that in this case the median's acceptance set is an interval centered at the median's ideal point, and whose width depends on the distribution of proposal power and on the level of impatience in the legislature. Additionaly, it shows that the social acceptance set coincides with the median's acceptance set:
where j is the maximal deviation that the median can approve, in other words, it is the distance that policy can be moved away from the median so that the median is just indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the proposal. Formally j satis…es the following equation:
Notice that a legislator who expects that the social acceptance set is as that given in (1) will make a proposal of the following form: The equilibrium outcome can be illustrated as in Figure 3 . In this …gure equilibrium policy proposals are represented as black dots.
Proposition 1 Suppose the status quo is distinct from the median policy position q 6 = b x m : Then there exists a unique stationary equilibrium and it is no-delay. Policy proposals in this equilibrium take the form (3) where j is the unique j = 1; 2; :::; k that satis…es:
The social acceptance set is
where j is implicitly de…ned in (2).
The strategy of proof for Proposition 1 is the following. First, existence of stationary equilibria is established: we …nd a no-delay equilibrium as a function of the parameters of the model (Lemma 1 in the Appendix). Second, the set of stationary equilibria is more precisely described: they can be either no-delay or static (Lemma 2). Third, the no-delay equilibrium is shown to be unique (Lemma 3). Fourth, we show that static equilibria with delay can be ruled out (Lemma 4).
The proposition implies that when the proposer is not the median legislator he is able to bias policy on the current issue in his direction by a positive amount. This deviation from median can be either the proposer's ideal point b x m jd if the proposer is su¢ ciently close to the median (j < j ) or is j away from the median, for proposers that are more extreme (j j ). The proposer's ability to move policy away from the median is measured by the width j of the social acceptance set.
The maximal equilibrium deviation depends on the parameters of the model ( ; q; ) in the following way. It decreases with the increased patience of all legislators ; as long as the median has positive recognition probability, as the discount factor approaches unity the unique stationary equilibrium outcome approaches the unique core alternative of this one-dimensional policy space -the median ideal point. This is an instance of the core equivalence result of Banks and Duggan (2003) . The width of the social acceptance is decreasing with the distance between the median b x m and the status quo q. Preference polarization does not a¤ect the extent of the maximal policy bias, but in ‡uences whether deviations will be predominantly to the left or to the right. With complete heterogeneity, deviations will be symmetric around the median; with complete homogeneity and an inegalitarian distribution of agenda-setting rights, there will be deviations that are systematically more likely to the left or to the right. In same cases equilibrium policy proposals are supported by supermajorities -see the examples below.
The maximal policy deviation also depends on the distribution of agenda power within the legislature, measured by the vector of recognition probabilities . The more power is concentrated in locations close to the median (locations m h; where h = 1; 2; :::; j 1) the smaller the policy deviation. This is not surprising. The pivotal legislator is the median. When faced with an extreme proposal the median will have a stronger incentive to block it the more likely it is that in the next period either himself or legislators close to him are going to be recognized.
Consider also the special case where the status quo happens to be the median legislator's ideal
If this is the case the median will clearly block all proposals that try to change the status quo. The social acceptance set is therefore the singleton fb x m g; which means that no policy other than the median can gather a majority of votes. This observation can be stated formally as follows.
Proposition 2 If the status quo is the median legislator's ideal policy q = b x m then the unique stationary equilibrium is the static no-delay equilibrium: all legislators propose the status quo in the …rst period and it is accepted by a majority. Thus the median gets its ideal point in all periods.
In the examples that follow we illustrate an interesting feature of equilibrium policy outcomes, namely systematic bias in policy away from the median requires both inegalitarian agenda access and some degree of preference polarization ( > min ). Notice that no matter how impatient the legislators or how heterogenous the parties, as long as the median controls the agenda the equilibrium outcome cannot diverge from the center; it will stay close to the median's preferences with probability one.
We can now formally represent Krehbiel's claim discussed above as a corollary to our …rst two propositions: The potential gap in Krehbiel's argument is the "only if" part. In other words, unless we assume that voting is costless (or, equivalently, that plenary time is not scarce), the median policy result holds only when the median monopolizes agenda power. Note, for example, that in the case of equal recognition the median policy is bounded away from the median voter's ideal policy by j .
But, following Krehbiel's intuition, it may easy to close this gap in the argument. It goes as follows.
As we have just showed the median legislator will always get the median policy if he is recognized to make the proposal, even if the (opportunity) costs of rejecting a proposal are substantial, i.e.
if is low. Now suppose we can vote on proposal rules and that the vote is by majority rule.
Then, wouldn't the median simply adopt a proposal rule that gives him as much proposal power (4) access to plenary time is egalitarian and unregulated.
"Egalitarian" means that each legislator has an equal probability for being recognized to make a proposal, while "unregulated" means that once a motion has been made all who wish to speak may speak without limits on debate. 13 Cox claims that such a legislative state of nature cannot persist. Rather, busy legislatures will evolve to create inequalities in member's access to ‡oor time and limit the members'ability to delay. More formally, if chambers can decide on their own internal organization by majority rule, 14 then the "legislative state of nature" cannot be an equilibrium in a game of organizational choice. 15 Cox makes his argument informally, but the logic is compelling. How is it related to Krehbiel's argument? The answer is clear: Busy legislatures may necessarily be inegalitarian (as Cox argues), but they may be inegalitarian by adopting procedures that give the median the maximal amount of power. In the absence of other arguments Krehbiel's view of the rule of the median is perfectly consistent with the idea of inegalitarian legislatures as long as it is the median that bene…ts from unequal allocation of proposal power. Of course, this is not Cox's position. He argues that it is parties that will be able to assume agenda control and proposal power. And so, we appear to have come full-circle. In other words, the opportunity costs associated with plenary bottlenecks may indeed lead to inegalitarian proposal, debate, and access rules, but it leaves open the question whether control over procedure rests with the median voter or the parties.
To address this question formally we explicitly model the choice of procedure. We start from the observation that at the beginning of each new legislature all members have equal agenda power and equal voting power. However, whereas equal voting power is a constitutional requirement, outside of the control of the legislature, the distribution of agenda power is a choice variable for the legislature. In other words, as long as a majority agrees to change the original state -in which each member is equally entitled to make legislative proposals -to a new distribution of agenda power, that new arrangement becomes binding on the entire legislative body. To capture this feature of legislative decisonmaking we allow legislators to change, through majority voting, the egalitarian status quo distribution of agenda power, in which each legislator has an equal chance to be recognized to make a motion to change the status quo. We refer to this initial stage of the model as the organizational stage.
The main feature of this initial stage of legislative decisionmaking therefore has to be egalitarian voting power and egalitarian agenda access. We will show that even starting from this "state of nature" where this dual power is equally distributed, the legislature may end up using majority voting to skew the distribution of agenda power towards a part of the legislature.
We assume that at the organizational stage legislators use pure majority rule to redistribute agenda power. Pure majority rule is an idealized open rule in which every legislator has an equal chance to be recognized to make a motion. After a motion is made a majority vote is taken between the motion and the last motion passed (the status quo motion). If the motion passes it becomes the new status quo. Then, any legislator can make a motion to change the status quo or to stop taking motions. The sequence of motions and votes continues until either a majority votes to stop taking motions or no motion exists that can beat the status quo. The timing of the organizational stage is the following:
Structural stage: Legislators decide on a number n of agenda setting positions (1 n 2k+1)
that will share agenda power equally. The collective decision rule is pure majority rule. The status quo is the legislative state of nature i.e. equal sharing of agenda power n = 2k + 1:
Assignment stage: Once the number of agenda setting positions has been determined the legislature assigns legislators to those seats. Each legislator has one vote to allocate to whoever he deems to be the best candidate for a given position. The winner of the position is the candidate who gets the most votes. All legislators are candidates. In case of ties, winners are determined
randomly.
In what follows we will show that in equilibrium the legislature can decide on an inegalitarian distribution of agenda power. More speci…cally, the majority preference type will be able to obtain restrictive access to the agenda that biases policy outcomes towards its side of the policy space.
The adoption of these rules is based exclusively on a¢ nity in policy preferences and not on credible threats by party leaders (such as the exercise of power to nominate candidates for elected o¢ ces, support for members'electoral campaigns, access to party money, advantageous committee assignments etc.). In fact, in our model there is no party leadership or exogenous source of party power since all members of a preference type are identical at the organizational stage of the game.
As the analysis of the policy game makes clear in busy legislatures (i.e. where bargaining is costly < 1) the …nal policy outcome is heavily in ‡uenced by the distribution of agenda power . In particular the median's ideal point is only going to be the outcome only if the median monopolizes proposal power. In the formalization that we propose the recognition rules is endogenous. That is, the chamber decides its own organizational structure by majority rule. Thus the debate over parites versus median as controllers of agenda comes down to the following question: What are the equilibrium recognition rules adopted at the organizational stage?
We start by working backwards and solve for the equilibrium at the assignment stage, given the number of agenda-setting positions adopted at the structural stage.
Proposition 4 Once the number of agenda positions has been chosen in the structural stage, at the assignment stage each party prefers to allocate a given position to a member of his own preference type rather than to a member of the rival preference type.
Proposition 5
In a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium at the assignment stage all majority members coordinate by voting cohesively on the same candidates. That is, the …rst n winners of the agendasettign positions are majority members and each gets all the k+1 votes of the majority.
Intuitively at the assignment stage the majority (the B preference type) is able to solve a collective action problem, namely overcoming the individual incentive that each B-legislator has to side with the minority if o¤ered a valuable agenda-setting position. It is in the collective interest of the B majority to prevent its members from defecting since having more B agenda setters bene…ts all members of the B majority. The result is that B-legislators gain priority in …lling the agenda-setting positions since they are able to gather more votes than A-legislators. An important implication of this assignment behavior is that representation in the o¢ ces endowed with agenda power will not mirror the ideological composition of the legislature; instead there will be over-representation of the majority preference type B and under-representation of the minority preference type A: This prediction of the model is fully consistent with the facts. In the U.S. Congress representation in the important policy committees such as Ways and Means, Appropriations and Finance has been consistently skewed in favor of the majority party. In particular, the chairs of the committees and subcommittees are invariably occupied by members of the majority. 16 We close backwards induction by analyzing the …rst stage of the organizational game: How many agenda positions would a legislative majority prefer? The following proposition characterizes the preferences of majority members over policy biases arising from di¤erent legislative structures.
Proposition 6
With preference homogeneity ( = min ) all legislators prefer zero policy deviation from the median. With preference polarization ( min < < 1) majority members prefer a policy deviation in between the legislative median and b
With maximal polarization ( = 1) the majority's preferred policy deviation is at the majority median.
Finally we can characterize the types of legislative structures adopted in equilibrium. These depend on the degree of preference polarization in the legislature.
Proposition 7
With preference homogeneity ( = min ) maximal centralization of agenda power cannot be an equilibrium; it is dominated by the legislative state of nature. At the other extreme, for su¢ ciently high preference polarization ( ) the legislative state of nature cannot be an equilibrium; it is dominated by maximal centralization.
Proposition 8 For high levels of patience ( ! 1) the legislative state of nature is the unique equilibrium under no polarization and maximal centralization is the unique equilibrium under maximal polarization.
Conclusion
To summarize, our model develops the following argument. 1 6 A notable exception is the Ethics Committees in each house of the U.S. Congress. Their role is to handle ethics violations by members of Congress. Party representation on these committees mirrors closely the compositon of the respective chamber. This exception con…rms the rule, however. Serving on Ethics is one the least sought after assignments, since no one wants to be associated with helping tarnish the public image of a fellow congressman. Many members of this committee are freshmen.
Suppose that:
Voting on policy is entirely determined by basic preferences. In particular, there are no punishments or rewards from changing one's vote.
(b) Voting on policy is by majority rule.
(c) Voting on organizational structure is by majority rule.
(d) Legislatures face a plenary bottleneck. That is, there non-negligible opportunity costs to debating and voting and proposals.
Then the following holds:
(*) Agenda control is concentrated among a party leader. In general, this is not the chamber median.
(**) Enacted policy outcomes are in expectation severely biased away from the median voter's ideal point.
But if (*) and (**) are true, why doesn't a majority just change the rules to eliminate the bias?
But this is a meaningless question in the absence of a fully speci…ed extensive form. Once we do have a model the question is restated as: What are the equilibria for voting on policy the organization of the legislature? And, at least in our model, even weak parties (i.e. groups of legislators that share nothing but a policy dispostion) will take control over the agenda to the extent possible.
Proof of Proposition 1
The strategy of proof is the following. First, existence of stationary equilibria is established: we …nd a no-delay equilibrium as a function of the parameters of the model (Lemma 1 below) . Second, the set of stationary equilibria is characterized: they can be either nodelay or static (Lemma 2). Third, the no-delay equilibrium is shown to be unique (Lemma 3).
Fourth, we show that static delay equilibria can be ruled out (Lemma 4).
Lemma 1
The proposal strategies described in Proposition 1, together with the corresponding voting strategies, constitute a no-delay stationary equilibrium. 
where
and j is a number between 1 and k:
is a no-delay stationary equilibrium if:
Because preferences are quadratic, Lemma 1 in Banks and Duggan (2001) ensures that the social acceptance set A( ) is identical with the acceptance set of the core voter, in our case the median legislator:
The acceptance set of the median legislator in the equilibrium is:
We …rst prove the following properties of the 0 j s that will be useful in showing that for a given parameter vector there is a unique j in the equilibrium range [(j 1) d; jd] : These are:
To see this, substract from the equation de…ning j the equation de…ning j+1 : Rearranging we obtain:
i and so
which proves the inequalities (6)- (8) .
We can now show that the proposal strategies (p i ) i2N de…ned in Proposition 1 are sequentially rational. First, we will demonstrate that there is a unique j for which
call it j : Whenever (9) holds we will say that j is in its equilibrium range. Second, we will demonstrate that the condition (j 1) d < j < j d together with the equation de…ning j support a no-delay stationary equilibrium of the form conjectured in Proposition 1.
If j is in its equilibrium range then all higher-indexed 0 s lie at least one range below their equilibrium range. Moreover they are all larger than j : To see this, note that using (6) j < jd implies j < j+1 < jd: This further implies that j+1 < (j + 1) d; which again by (6) yields j+1 < j+2 < (j + 1) d: Reasoning like this we can infer that j < j+1 < j+2 < ::: < k and j+1 ; j+2 ; :::; k all lie at least one range below their respective equilibrium ranges. If j is in its equilibrium range then all lower-indexed 0 s are at least one range above their equilibrium range, beacause if they were in or below their equilibrium ranges then, since j is higher-indexed, they would draw down j at least a range below their equilibrium range (this follows by applying the logic of the previous paragraph). Moreover, all lower-indexed 0 s are larger than j ; because if j 1 exceeds its range, by (8) it must be larger than j ; because if j 2 exceeds its range, by (8) it must be larger than j 1 ; and, since j 1 > j , larger than j as well, and so on.
Suppose that the equilibrium acceptance set of the median voter is [b x m j ; b x m + j ]: We will verify that this can be supported by equilibrium strategies. By Lemma 1 in Banks and Duggan (2001) this is also the social acceptance set:
When legislator i is recognized to make a proposal he will propose that policy in A that is closest to his ideal point. Legislators with j < j have their ideal point inside A and so they will propose their ideal points b x m jd. Legislators with j j have their ideal points outside of A and so they will select either the lower or the upper bound of A, depending on whether their ideal point lies at the left or at the right of A: Therefore, the equation de…ning j (the median best responds to proposals b x m j ) implicitly de…nes the above conjectured social acceptance set
In the same manner it can be veri…ed that no other social acceptance set supports an equilibrium of the form conjectured in Proposition 1. 
Proof. See Cho and Duggan (2002).
Lemma 4 In the policy game with q 6 = b x m there exists no stationary equilibrium with delay.
Proof. By Lemma 2 above we know that a stationary equilibrium with delay is necessarily static i.e. the policy outcomes are (q; q; q; :::). Denote this equilibrium by : First, note that the median is indi¤erent between voting for and against the status quo: the outcome in the current period is identical, as is the outcome in all future periods. The social acceptance set corresponding to this equilibrium therefore contains the status quo. Second, note that by de…nition the median's acceptance set can never strictly contain the status quo, because the median has veto power over all proposals and so it will not approve any policy that is further away from its ideal point than the status quo is. Based on these two observations the status quo must be on the boundary of the social acceptance set. This is illustrated in the following …gure.
Social Acceptance Set
Furthermore, since the equilibrium is static, it must be that only legislators outside the social acceptance set on the side of the boundary that is the status quo, have proposal power. Otherwise policies di¤erent than the status quo will be proposed and accepted. But then all those legislators with proposal power will propose the status quo and their proposal will pass, which means that the equilibrium is without delay. In the above …gure, only legislators 2 and 4 have agenda power and when recognized they both propose the status quo.
Proof of Proposition 2
It is straightforward to verify that when q = b x m the game has a static no-delay equilibrium. First, since the median is getting its ideal point in all future periods, the only proposal that it will accept today is the status quo. If a di¤erent proposal were made, legislators closeer to the proposal than to the status quo are going to vote for it, but that is not enough for it to pass. The social acceptance set is therefore the singleton fb x m g : Second, given the voting strategies implicit in this social acceptance set any legislator with proposal power is indi¤erent between all proposals, since the median is able to preserve the status quo no matter what. Since proposing the status quo is the most expeditious thing to do for all proposers, their strategy will be to propose the status quo, which is in the social acceptance set and therefore approved by a majority.
To show uniqueness, suppose that there exists another stationary equilibrium that is either non-static or with delay. If the equilbrium is non-static it means that a legislator with proposal power when recognized will propose a policy di¤erent than the status quo and his proposal will be accepted by a majority. Consider the most extreme of these proposals. For this particular proposal the voting behavior just described is not sequentially rational, however. All legislators on the other side of the median from the proposal are better o¤ rejecting this proposal since they improve their payo¤ both today (status quo is preferred to the proposal) and in the future (on average future proposals will be closer to the legislators on the other side). If the equilibrium is with delay there are two cases. First, it can be that at a later period a proposer makes a proposal di¤erent than the status quo and it is approved by a majority. This is not sequentially rational by the same logic exposed for the non-static equilibrium. Second, it can be that there are proposals made that are either the median or are never approved. This is clearly not an equilibrium either, given the assumprion that when indi¤erent among proposals the one that is more likely to be approved is made.
Proof of Proposition 3 The frirst conclusion can be seen by setting = 1 in the de…nition of a social acceptance set. Since the median can wait inde…nitely for its turn to propose, its only acceptable proposal its own ideal point. The last two follow directly form Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose there were n positions of power created at the structural stage.
Consider legislator i: The di¤erence in expected payo¤ between appointing a legislator of his own type (call him i 0 ) and appointing a legislator of the other type (j) is:
where x (l) := min fld; g ; and is the maximal equilibrium policy deviation from the status quo.
This expression is positive since:
In words, two members of the same preference type are more likely to be on the same side of the median than two members of the other preference type, and less likely to be on opposite sides of the median than two members of the other preference type.
Proof of Proposition 5 Suppose …rst that a the structural stage there were n k + 1 agenda postions created. First, suppose there is a equilibrium where a minority member wins an agendasetting position with say x votes. Then the k + 1 majority members can form a coalition to replace the minority member with one of them. This deviation is pro…table for all coalition members, because they all strictly prefer a majority agenda-setter to a minority agenda-setter (according to Proposition 4).
Second, why do all majority members vote cohesively in equilibrium? Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium in which only majority members win agenda-setting positions. Can it be that at least some of these are won with fewer than k + 1 majority votes? No, because if a majority candidate gets less than k + 1 majority votes, then the coalition of k minority members can coordinate on the same minority candidate and so allow him a nonzero probability of winning.
This deviation makes all members of the deviating coalition strictly better o¤, because whereas before they had a zero chance to …ll this position, now they have at least a positive probability to win it for one of their members.
The argument for n > k + 1 is similar.
Proof of Proposition 6
First take the case of preference homogeneity ( = min ). At the beginning of the game a legislator's expected payo¤ from a legislative structure that produces a maximal deviation of is: Second, take the case of maximal polarization ( = 1). A majority member's expected payo¤ from a legislative structure that produces a maximal deviation and where all agenda-setting positions go to the majority preference type B is:
The slope in of this expected payo¤ on a generic segment ld (l + 1) d is:
which implies that the payo¤ is maximized at = Proof of Proposition 7 We consider two separate cases. For each we start from the observation that the maximal policy deviation under maximal centralization (n = 1) is larger than the maximal policy deviation under the legislative state of nature (n = 2k + 1). This follows directly from equation (2).
First take the case of zero polarization ( = min ). Here a legislator's expected payo¤ does not depend on the legislative structure directly, only through the extent of the policy deviation. 
and therefore, since v n b slopes downwards starting from zero slope at = 0; we have 17
and so the legislative state of nature strictly dominates maximal centralization.
Second take the case of maximal polarization ( = 1). Here a legislator's expected payo¤ does depend on the legislative structure both directly and through the extent of the policy deviation.
Moroever it is easy to show that v 1 b ( ) and v 
